“This started before Maliki and will go on long after Maliki.”
– Hayder al-Khoei

From left: Zuhair al-Naher, Dominic Asquith, Hayder al-Khoei, Ian Black and Zaid Al-Ali (via Skype).

Opening the panel discussion on recent developments in Iraq held at the Frontline Club on Tuesday 24 June, Ian Black, Middle East editor for The Guardian, asked why the international community and the government in Baghdad had been taken by surprise by the current crisis.

In introducing the panel, Black stressed the need to look at “Iraq itself, the nature of what is going on, the role and significance of ISIS (and whether it should indeed be called that), the sectarian element of the crisis, the legacy of the invasion of 2003, Iran, the US and our [the UK’s] own role in the current situation.”

Hayder al-Khoei, associate fellow at the Middle East and North Africa programme at Chatham House, began by analysing the potential for the crisis to quickly descend “within the next few weeks or even days” into an open Sunni–Shia conflict.

Citing widespread support from local civilians as well as other Sunni militias, al-Khoei stressed that for the most powerful of these insurgent groups their advance had “absolutely nothing to do with winning more rights for the Sunni Arab community . . . or even defending the Sunni Arabs in Iraq despite that being their narrative”.

“It’s much bigger than that. . . . It’s about overthrowing the Iraq government regardless of whether Maliki is prime minister.”

Arguing that while some have chosen to read the rise of ISIS as a direct result of the Iraq invasion, al-Khoei spoke of “a real sense [from talking to people throughout the country] that the jihadist groups and insurgents in Iraq have refused to acknowledge the post-2003 political order” where Shias hold the balance of power.

While acknowledging that Maliki had made mistakes, Zuhair al-Naher, spokesman for the Iraqi prime minster, corroborated this by suggesting that many Sunni politicians “cannot yet understand, or come to terms with the reality that they are a minority”.

While all on the panel agreed that secularism does have a role to play within Iraq, there was also a consensus that this is not yet, at least, a sectarian war. Al-Naher rejected the assertion, propagated in the media and through ISIS, that the Sunnis have been “repressed, downtrodden and marginalised”, citing the positions of power occupied by Sunnis in the military and government and claiming that this was a deliberate attempt by ISIS to define the parameters of the conflict. Most notably al-Khoei cited the objectives of the insurgent groups differing between the ultimate goal of an Islamic Caliphate, as envisioned by ISIS, and the return to a form of pre-2003 secular dictatorship of the Baathists.

https://twitter.com/nicolaannettek/status/481794885448904704
Zaid Al-Ali, a former legal advisor to the UN in Iraq, disagreed that the solution to Sunni unrest was increased “inclusivity in government” – but rather the need to tackle the problems of random arrest and torture faced by ordinary citizens.

Dominic Asquith, British ambassador to Iraq 2006–07, suggested that while insurgents such as ISIS – operating outside centralised urban control command centres – have been ever-present since 2003, the origins of Sunni extremism lay in the lack of any “unifying vision for Iraq”.

“Iraq’s leaders have never combined for something . . . but they have at times taken a united stand against something . . . and it looks as though there is a real risk we will go back to rebuilding a house of cards again.”

Asquith went on to name a potential three-part solution to the current problem. First was to contain ISIS, second was to install a new leadership in Baghdad – one that rejected sectarianism and perhaps embraced de-centralisation – and third was to change the narrative (including the relationship between Iran and the US towards Iraq) of aggressor and victim.

Touching on points by both Asquith and al-Naher, al-Ali agreed that while the responsibility for the crisis was not solely Maliki’s, his eight-year leadership of Iraq meant that there was a need for “a new leader to try their hand”.

Returning to an emerging sectarianism, al-Koehi said:

“Sometimes we over analyse and over read Shia–Sunni conflicts and whether there are regionally backed coup attempts or bribes or a variety of other conspiracy theories. But I genuinely believe sometimes the simplest explanation is the best and, as Zaid [al-Ali] mentioned, this is incompetence.”

To this, Asquith added:

“If you amass the various incompetent decisions taken early on after 2003, we are seeing the effect of those now in terms of creating a confessional system. There was confessionalism instituted right at the outset, there was in retrospect an utterly disastrous de-Baathification process which helped create that distrust between communities and there was a reliance on exiles who didn’t really understand [Iraq]”.

Agreeing that the ultimate aim of ISIS was to provoke an all-out sectarian conflict, the panel concluded by discussing the means by which this might be achieved.

Referencing the ‘hearts and minds campaign’ that ISIS have embarked on and which has emerged from various media outlets, al-Khoei qualified the group’s apparent attempt to moderate themselves as “not coming anywhere near being moderate – it just means they are slightly less extreme”.

For Zaid al-Ali, “it may be that ISIS have been trying to put on a more humanitarian face but they cannot succeed because they are pathologically wired to destroy, kill and terrorise”.

Catch up with the full event here:

The Frontline Club’s First Wednesdays kicked off a discussion on the news story that has dominated all others over the past month: Boko Haram and the hunt for Nigeria’s missing schoolgirls. Channel 4 News’ foreign affairs correspondent Jonathan Miller, chairing the evening’s discussion, began by asking who are Boko Haram? What are their ultimate objectives? How have they evolved to take centre stage in the global media spotlight?

L-R Jonathan Miller, Fatima Akilu, Kayode Ogundamisi, Andrew Walker and Bala Liman

Analysing the group’s evolution from a local spiritually led Islamist organisation driven by the charismatic leadership of Mohammed Yusuf in the early 2000s, to the now-militant cult whose brand of ultra-orthodox sharia law and extreme tactics have made them international ‘bogeymen’, Andrew Walker, a writer and journalist working in Nigeria since 2006, charted the groups repositioning contra-government authority to become “more and more anti-state”.

Miller put to Fatima Akilu, director of behavioural analysis in Nigeria’s office of the National Security Adviser, that this repositioning was initially utilised by state authorities, “that there are political connections with Boko Haram, and at some point the group became a very useful militia which was used to political ends by politicians”.

Effectively representing the government, Akilu confirmed that “the group did work with state governors at the time and helped them to mobilise the youth who were used for election purposes”.

Kayode Ogundamisi, writer and commentator on Nigeria affairs, claimed Boko Harem’s shift towards militancy was a result of the “extra-judicial execution of its spiritual leader Mohammed Yusuf”, leading to the radicalisation of the more extreme elements within the group. Ogundamisi criticised the police for their treatment of Yusuf and several other leaders, claiming that it is they (and, by extension, the state) who are ultimately responsible for the change in tactics that Boko Harem have since adopted.

“This led to what we have today. You cannot accept any state who fights terror with a method of terrorism. The way the government treated Yusuf provided a tool for the terrorist to recruit more sympathisers.”

Bala Liman, doctoral candidate at SOAS examining the nexus between conflict and identity in Nigeria, developed this point further.

“Half of the problem, and why Boko Haram is still existing, is because the military is carrying on these extra-judicial killings, people are getting arrested randomly . . . and, most importantly, the government are capturing [Boko Haram’s] women.”

Liman continued on the subject of the missing schoolgirls, stating that the abduction tactics employed by Boko Haram are as much a personal response to the actions of the government as a terror strategy.

Boko Haram seen as a "northern problem" – this has undermined a united Nigerian response @frontlineclub

— Sandrine Tiller (@sandrinetiller) June 4, 2014

Akilu sought to differentiate the actions of Boko Haram by contextualising the most recent incident, and why it achieved such international attention.

“What was different about these girls [compared to the brutal massacring of girl in the past] was that they took them alive.”

Discussing the potential solutions to the current situation, Walker was quick to point out the difficulties in attempting negotiations between Boko Haram and the government due to the complex internal structure of the group.

“It’s never really sure who you are talking to – whether that’s the full totality of the group. Because of the way it’s arranged, split into factions, means it’s very difficult to organise how to get to these people. I think one of the biggest problems of this whole group is that they are a kind of unknowable empty space in this remote place and all of these fault lines flow through this empty space. We don’t know how Boko Haram organise themselves, we don’t know how they tell themselves whether they are spiritual or not and it’s difficult for people who are outside, be it the presidency or here looking in, to understand what is going on and how to get in there and do anything.”

Likening Boko Haram to a franchise, Ogundamisi responded that while it is irresponsible and dangerous to negotiate with a group whose goal is to Islamise Nigeria, “the first priority is for the state to enforce itself as a state”.

All the panel agreed that what lay at the heart of the issue was the corruption within Nigeria and the inherent mistrust that ordinary Nigerians have for state institutions – from education to the army.

While the panel also recognised a need to prevent the “next generation” of young people becoming radicalised, there was disagreement as to the solutions effected on the ground, be they long term or in dealing specifically with the present abduction crisis.

Quoting Yasser Arafat that “the person you negotiate with is your enemy”, Ogundamisi cited the influence of the hardline core group within Boko Haram, combined with a federal system where power is so centralised in one man, which makes any negotiation virtually impossible and ultimately undesirable.

Watch and listen here: