“A case study of how an idea written on paper sacks in the midst of the gulag archipelago could one day be pronounced as a national idea by the heirs of the NKVD.”
– Charles Clover, Black Wind, White Snow: The Rise of Russia’s New Nationalism

Charles Clover, the Financial Times’ former Moscow bureau chief, began the debate at the Frontline Club on Thursday 28 April by defining the idea of Eurasianism as, “essentially an artificial nationalism created in the 1920s by Russian exiles to rationalise and justify, in theoretical terms, an empire where Russia forms the core of a unique non-western civilisation.”

It was not until the collapse of the Soviet Union that these ideas were re-discovered and re-appropriated by “regime dead-enders who wanted to see a continuation of the soviet empire but on other terms,” through a different idea that would justify it.

Driven by the rhetoric coming out of the Kremlin and propagated by the media, “this is not an ethnic nationalism,” said Clover, but rather a “civilisational nationalism” with Russia at its centre.

While not a new idea, Eurasianism as part of official discourse only appeared very recently, said writer and broadcaster Mary Dejevsky.

Eurasianism was an attempt to bring some sort of concord between the pro-western and Slavophil strands of thinking that had dominated Russian society since the turn of the 20^th century, “at a time when Russia was looking for an identity for itself… especially in terms seeking a definition of nationhood,” said Dejevsky.

“The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 left Russia with a huge identity crisis that took a long time to enter official consciousness, but that has really started to crystallise in the last two or three years.”

Rodric Braithwaite, British ambassador to Russia from 1988 to 1992, said that Eurasianism is merely the “current phase of something that has gone on a very long time in Russian history.

“With a humiliating collapse, questions of identity – who we are, what we are – become vital and people produce fake answers which can then be exploited by politicians.”

Russian history, said Braithwaite, is a succession of humiliations and “the Slavophil-Eurasian idea is partly a compensatory device for the various disasters that have happened” – and a way of rationalising that with the idea of Russia as a great nation.

Clover said he would group this philosophy of Eurasianism with Russia’s changing relationship to the West as part of a multi-national nationalism designed to accomplish certain strategic objectives.

BOOK LAUNCH: @charles_clover 'Black Wind, White Snow', 27 April @YaleBooks https://t.co/kmdYY1B8GO pic.twitter.com/dJ4KSWF1iX

— Pushkin House (@Pushkin_House) April 17, 2016

At the same time confronted by a more nationalistic opposition during Putin’s third term, the Kremlin decided to equate this sense of national humiliation with the idea of a foreign conspiracy and promote a Eurasianism that “would ensure the integrity of a multi-national state and possibly expand it” said Clover.

Gabriel Gatehouse, chair of the debate and BBC Newsnight foreign correspondent, asked the panel to comment on the observation that a lot of the current official Russian discourse seems to be aimed at trying to return to a bi-polar world, reminiscent of Cold War divides.

For Dejevsky, many Russians are not looking to resurrect the old Cold War order, “but rather a multi-polar world where a smaller Russia co-exists but has an equal voice with other powers in the world.”

“There is a resort to Eurasianism, whether organised or simply as a concept, when Russia feels that is has been cold shouldered, especially by Europe, and is looking to a certain identity which has some justification, some basis, in a Russia that belongs to both Europe and Asia,” she said.

In this context, said Clover, the question of whether Putin himself believes in the idea of Eurasianism is almost irrelevant.

“We assume that Putin is a pragmatist at heart and only really cares about power. That has always and will always be true, but the context of his pragmatism has changed utterly over ten years.”

In the past, pragmatism was paying lip-service to nationalism, said Clover, but now national interests are denominated in completely different ways in terms of territory, making it pragmatic for Putin to seize Crimea and put troops into eastern Ukraine.

“The entire context of being Putin has changed. The playing field in Russia is now a totally nationalist one. So as a skilful, powerful politician, the way he plays politics has changed and as a pragmatist he must now be a nationalist.”

Please join us for a screening of Oleg Sentsov’s award-winning film Gamer. The screening will be followed by a Q&A via Skype with Sentsov’s cousin, Natalia Kaplan, who remains his key supporter and has followed his every step throughout the trial.

The event will be attended by prominent UK cultural figures, including the Young Vic’s Artistic Director, David Lan; the Founding Director of Open City Documentary Festival, Michael Stewart; and the Deputy Chairman European Film Academy, Mike Downey. Additional guests will be announced soon.

Prior to the screening, Kolonist wine company will be kindly providing Ukrainian wine for all attendees. We invite you to help us raise awareness of Sentsov’s plight, and to raise funds for his young family. Sentsov is a single parent to two children who are now cared for by their aunt and grandmother. The family remain strong and resolute, but having lost the main breadwinner there is no doubt that they will need as much support as possible. The admission fee to this event is £25.00, all of which will be donated to Sentsov’s Fund. If you cannot attend the event but would like to donate, please click on this link for bank details.

Below is a message from Oleg’s lawyer, Dimitri Dintze:

We ask that you do not give up and continue to rally in support of Oleg. Approximately 70% of the money coming in from your European side had gone to legal fees (legal fees, numerous trips to Moscow to the Crimea, and, of course, to Rostov-on-Don, as well as things like notarised translations of documents), approximately 30% went to the family and kids.

And once again letters in prison are very important to Oleg – he has almost nothing to do and without letters can only stare at the coffee grindings, and imagine what happens outside. Do not forget to attach the envelope to the response. 344082, Rostov-na-Donu, p.o. box 2710, Sencovu Oleg Gennadyevichu, born 1976.

Thanks again for the support, everything you do is very important.

Details of Sentsov’s case:

In May 2014, Oleg Sentsov was accused of planning terrorist acts, then arrested and put on trial after attending a protest against the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula. In June of that year, a number of prominent European filmmakers, including Ken Loach, Agnieszka Holland, Pedro Almodóvar and Wim Wenders, signed an open letter to the Russian president, Vladimir Putin, calling for Sentsov’s release.

On 25 August 2015, the Russian Court convicted the filmmaker and his co-defendant, Alexander Kolchenko, following a trial which was described by Amnesty International as “redolent of Stalinist-era show trials.” Sentsov was sentenced to 20 years in prison, despite reports of the defendants being tortured and after the main witness retracted testimony given under duress.

The Russian penitentiary system can be brutal, and in some instances (such as the case of Sergei Magnitsky) lethal. It is therefore all the more important to ensure that Sentsov’s name remains in the headlines, to remind the Russian government that his case will not be ignored or forgotten.

Oleg Sentsov and his crew, courtesy of Natalia Kaplan

Photo credits: Sergey Pivovarov/Reuters; Yekaterina Chesnakova/RIA Novosti

This event will be held in partnership with

Following months of unrest, Ukraine has a new leader. Known as the Chocolate King, Petro Poroshenko is tasked with restoring law and order, and steering the country away from conflict.

As fighting in the east continues, we will be looking at the challenges that lie ahead for Poroshenko and asking how he will unite the country.

Central to the battle in Ukraine has been the use of disinformation and propaganda in an information war. With a panel of journalist who have been covering the crisis, we will look at how the facts have been distorted and to what end.

Chaired by Bridget Kendall, diplomatic correspondent, BBC News.

The panel:

Katya Gorchinskaya is deputy editor of the Kyiv Post, a position she has held since 2008. She belongs to a group of journalists who investigate documents found in Mezhyhirya (YanukovychLeaks).

Dmitry Linnik is the head of the London bureau for Voice of Russia. He began his career in 1973 working for the English-language service of Radio Moscow, he went on to work for BBC World Service, initially in Moscow and then in London before moving to Voice of Russia.

Yevhen Fedchenko is director of the Mohyla School of Journalism and head of their PhD programme in mass communication. He is one of the founders of stopfake.org, a watchdog of Russian disinformation regarding Ukraine.

Victor Balagadde is the editor of Kommersant UK, a position he has held since 2009. He has also written for New Style, a Russian language magazine published in London and the Ukrainian Kharkovsky Courier.

Photograph: Getty Images

With support from:

Letters to Myself, which screened at the Frontline Club on Monday 14 April, follows Russian photographer Oleg Klimov as he returns to the places he documented during the disintegration of the Soviet Union in the 1990s and into the 2000s. The film combines Klimov‘s memories with the stories of the people he photographed at the time.

Director Masha Novikova spent some time filming Klimov in Chechnya in 2000 and later in 2003–05 whilst working on a different film but has known Klimov for over 20 years and has wanted to film him at work for just as long but it took some time to secure funding.

Novikova said through a translator after the screening:

“It was my first war and my first time in a ruined city and of course it was quite tragic for me . . . for Oleg it hasn’t been the first time so . . . he was much more cynical than I was.”

Klimov, speaking through the translator via Skype from his mother’s home near Moscow which appears in the film, spoke about how he felt being the subject of the film instead of being behind the camera:

“It did take us quite a long time, Masha and I, the crew, everybody was looking for the people we were asking about, trying to find out about their stories and it was a very moving, very emotional time for me, as you can imagine 20 years later. It took me back to those times.”

Oleg Klimov speaks via Skype at the Frontline Club

A question from the audience asked what he thought had changed in Grozny, having been back to since the war? Klimov said:

“I’ve actually seen Grozny during three times, pre-war, wartime and post-wartime. . . . These are three completely different realities.

 

“The first reality is basically Chechnya the republic, just like perhaps the majority of post-Soviet republics. People just lived normal lives, it was not very exciting, nothing was really happening. Although you could see that conflicts started breaking out.

 

“ . . . The second reality is the reality of war which is again quite similar to any . . . place which is in the state of war, which is terror and horror.”

 

“ . . . The third reality, which I’ve witnessed the most recent time I’ve been to Chechnya was last year, . . . that feeling was basically surreal, because when you walk down the street knowing about the two previous realities, having seen all that I’ve seen, the question rises that you do not understand what it was all for, why did it all happen? . . . All this money that went first on the wars, and then to restore the city it’s just incomprehensible.”

A further question from the audience asked, how did Grozny change so quickly, who rebuilt it?

Klimov said:

“This can be what we call compromise at best for the Russian government. . . . Because they couldn’t win the war in Chechnya . . . the idea was to buy peace there. . . . They’ve invested a lot of money . . . but the price that the people are paying, that’s where . . . the fear comes from. . . . There is no freedom of speech, no freedom of expression. . . . That’s the price they pay for peace and stability.”

What was it all for? People versus characters: what's left when the motherland gets covered in skyscrapers @frontlineclub with @PhotoAmmon

— Rasa Jusionyte (@rasajusionyte) April 14, 2014

Novikova added:

“Even though it [the war] was a terrible time people did speak out very freely . . . about defending the land and about being free and independent. And I felt a huge respect and love for these people . . . but now I see that even my friends they try to avoid calling things as they are, they use very vague language.”

How does Klimov approach the wars he photographs? How does he feel about the wars as a Russian?

The translator explained:

“It’s very difficult being a Russian, while Russia is fighting Chechnya because of course this dilemma of being a citizen of Russia and being a journalist, . . . [he was] trying to find ways to be neutral, to be right on the front line, not choosing sides. It was really difficult. . . . At one point, Oleg decided that he is going to be guided by a principle, he is not actually going to choose a nation or a people but he is going to be empathetic with the weakest one or the side that is unarmed.”

And what are Klimov’s thoughts on the recent outbreak in Crimea?

“It’s a very absurd and strange situation when we have these polite armed men with Kalashnikovs who nobody knows who they are but everybody knows that they are either special forces or private army that is linked of course to Russia. But it’s not the official troops, it’s not the official Russian army so it’s a strange situation where everybody understands but nobody actually names it or discusses it as official Russian army.”

David Cameron has subsequently agreed to EU sanctions and travel bans have been imposed on Russian officials. But would our response have been stronger were it not for the importance of Russian money to London?

Russians are granted more investor visas than any other nationality; Russians buy London property, send their children to British schools and hire British lawyers and bankers. For some, Britain has become a shamelessly mercenary country, putting financial gain before morality.

Others argue that the government is right to put growth first; its obligations are to the British people, who are interested in their livelihoods, not the legality of a referendum in Crimea. Are sanctions even the best approach? With them comes the risk of isolating Putin, making a diplomatic solution to the Ukraine crisis less likely.

Standpoint magazine brings together a distinguished panel to debate Britain’s response to Russia’s annexation of Crimea.

Chaired by Daniel Johnson, the founding editor of Standpoint. He covered the end of the Cold War for The Daily Telegraph and is the author of White King and Red Queen: How the Cold War was Fought on a Chess Board.

The panel:

Ben Judah has reported for Standpoint from Russia and Ukraine. He is the author of Fragile Empire: How Russian Fell In And Out Of Love With Vladimir Putin.

Tony Brenton worked for 30 years for the Foreign Office and was British Ambassador in Russia from 2004 to 2008. In 2007 he was awarded a KCMG. He is now extraordinary fellow of Wolfson College, Cambridge.

Roger Boyes is diplomatic editor at The Times. Previously he has worked as a foreign correspondent in Eastern Europe, Berlin and Rome.

Peter Hitchens is a journalist, broadcaster and author. He is a columnist on the Mail on Sunday and has worked as a foreign correspondent in Moscow and Washington.

Your ticket will include a copy of Standpoint magazine.