s air force and air defense systems, the training of Azeri military in Russia, and repair services for military equipment.
[...]
Azerbaijan is now putting the emphasis on acquiring new aviation equipment for its air force. in 2005, it signed a contract with Ukraine for the delivery of 12 MiG-29 fighters, two MiG-29UB aircraft, and 12 L-39 training aircraft. It bought 12 Su-25 assault planes (probably Czech) and one Su-27UB from Georgia. Negotiations with Ukraine for the acquisition of Su-27 fighters and Su-25 assault planes have also been reported, along with modernization in Ukraine of Azeri Mi-24 combat helicopters by the South African ATE companyâ€s Super Hind Mk-III program. Azerbaijan is reportedly looking to acquire 24 of the new Chinese FC-1 light fighters. It is also purchasing UAVs from Israel, all of which attests to the clear intention of the Azeri military leadership to achieve air superiority as a top priority.
[...]
By 2008, the Azeri armed forces have overtaken the Armenian once in terms of active personnel (73 thousand) and armament. However, this numerical superiority is compensated by the army of the unrecognized NKR, which has about the same amount of arms as the official land forces of either Armenia or Azerbaijan. Moreover, over the past 14 years the Armenians have worked constantly to improve and fortify their line of defense in Nagorno-Karabakh, reaching from the Mrav heights to the Araks river. Furthermore, Armenia is part of the Russian-led CIS Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), and about four thousand Russian troops are deployed in Armenia, mostly at the 102nd base in Gyumri.
Nevertheless, the rapid growth of Azeri defense expenditures, driving the strong rearmament of the Azeri armed forces, is putting into question the ability of the Armenians to maintain the military balance with Azerbaijan. This is particularly pertinent with respect to Azerbaijanâ€s buildup of its air force and projected acquisitions of modern and high-precision weaponry. Official figures probably understate the volume of Armenian defense spending, but several Azeri estimates put the actual defense spending of Armenia and the NKR for 2008 at about 800 million USD, which seems likely. But the overall trend is clearly in Azerbaijanâ€s favor, and it seems that Armenia will not be able to sustain an arms race with Azerbaijanâ€s oil-fueled economy. And this could lead to the destabilization of the frozen conflict between these two states.</blockquote>
<a href="http://mdb.cast.ru/mdb/2-2008/item2/article2/" rel="nofollow">http://mdb.cast.ru/mdb/2-2008/item2/article2/</a>
]]>Nagorno-Karabakh: Shift in the Military Balance
Mikhail Barabanov
While the international media focuses on the confrontations in Abkhazia and South Ossetia and Georgia’s rapid rearmament, the forgotten dispute over Nagorno-Karabakh continues to smolder. Indeed, it seems only a matter of time before the conflict between Azerbaijan on the one hand, and Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh on the other, bursts into flames again.
[…]
From 2007, Azerbaijan also began to acquire arms from Russia. In particular, Azerbaijan was the first to place an order for the new Russian BTR-90, signing a contract with the Arzamas Machine Building Plant for delivery in 2008 of a few BTR-90s and 70 BTR-80A. One of the conditions of the agreement reached in 2002 over the status of the Gabalina radar station was the provision of military assistance to modernize Azerbaijan’s air force and air defense systems, the training of Azeri military in Russia, and repair services for military equipment.
[…]
Azerbaijan is now putting the emphasis on acquiring new aviation equipment for its air force. in 2005, it signed a contract with Ukraine for the delivery of 12 MiG-29 fighters, two MiG-29UB aircraft, and 12 L-39 training aircraft. It bought 12 Su-25 assault planes (probably Czech) and one Su-27UB from Georgia. Negotiations with Ukraine for the acquisition of Su-27 fighters and Su-25 assault planes have also been reported, along with modernization in Ukraine of Azeri Mi-24 combat helicopters by the South African ATE company’s Super Hind Mk-III program. Azerbaijan is reportedly looking to acquire 24 of the new Chinese FC-1 light fighters. It is also purchasing UAVs from Israel, all of which attests to the clear intention of the Azeri military leadership to achieve air superiority as a top priority.
[…]
By 2008, the Azeri armed forces have overtaken the Armenian once in terms of active personnel (73 thousand) and armament. However, this numerical superiority is compensated by the army of the unrecognized NKR, which has about the same amount of arms as the official land forces of either Armenia or Azerbaijan. Moreover, over the past 14 years the Armenians have worked constantly to improve and fortify their line of defense in Nagorno-Karabakh, reaching from the Mrav heights to the Araks river. Furthermore, Armenia is part of the Russian-led CIS Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), and about four thousand Russian troops are deployed in Armenia, mostly at the 102nd base in Gyumri.
Nevertheless, the rapid growth of Azeri defense expenditures, driving the strong rearmament of the Azeri armed forces, is putting into question the ability of the Armenians to maintain the military balance with Azerbaijan. This is particularly pertinent with respect to Azerbaijan’s buildup of its air force and projected acquisitions of modern and high-precision weaponry. Official figures probably understate the volume of Armenian defense spending, but several Azeri estimates put the actual defense spending of Armenia and the NKR for 2008 at about 800 million USD, which seems likely. But the overall trend is clearly in Azerbaijan’s favor, and it seems that Armenia will not be able to sustain an arms race with Azerbaijan’s oil-fueled economy. And this could lead to the destabilization of the frozen conflict between these two states.
I think we’re not there yet with Karabakh, but a few years down the line, and especially when the oil money starts to run out? I’m reminded of how Scott Taylor described the Caucasus (and this has also been said by other journalists covering the region):
The Caucasus is like ten gangsters in an elevator each holding a gun to someone else’s head. All it will take is for one to sneeze to set off a violent chain reaction. link
Anyway, thanks for your comment. While many of us in the region tend to always view our ethnic conflicts in isolation are at the very most in the context of Kosovo, I suppose it’s time we examined other disputes elsewhere and also analyze, compare and consider.
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